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The Letter presents a novel way to connect random walks, stochastic differential equations, and
evolutionary game theory. We introduce a new concept of potential function for discrete-space
stochastic systems. It is based on a correspondence between one-dimensional stochastic differential
equations and random walks, which may be exact not only in the continuous limit but also in finite-
state spaces. Our method is useful for computation of fixation probabilities in discrete stochastic
dynamical systems with two absorbing states. We apply it to evolutionary games, formulating two
simple and intuitive criteria for evolutionary stability of pure Nash equilibria in finite populations.
In particular, we show that the 1/3 law of evolutionary games, introduced by Nowak et al [Nature,
2004], follows from a more general mean-potential law.
PACS numbers: 05.40.-a, 02.50.Le, 02.50.Ga, 87.23.Cc
Introduction. Many biological and social processes
can be modeled within the framework of evolutionary
game theory [1–3]. Players with different behaviors
(strategies) interact with each other and receive payoffs;
the higher the average payoff, the greater the chance that
the player’s offspring will replace another player, and so
the population changes its composition over time – in
favour of more profitable strategies. Maynard Smith and
Price [1, 2] introduced the fundamental notion of evolu-
tionarily stable strategy (ESS). If everybody plays such
a strategy, and a small group of mutants playing a differ-
ent one arrives, then the mutants will be eliminated from
the population due to natural selection. The dynamical
interpretation of evolutionarily stable strategies was later
provided by several authors [4–6]. They proposed a sys-
tem of differential equations, called replicator equations,
which describe how the abundance of particular strate-
gies in the population changes in time. It is known that
any evolutionarily stable strategy is an asymptotically
stable stationary point of such a dynamics [7].
Replicator equations describe the population behavior
in the limit of an infinite number of individuals. However,
real populations are finite. Stochastic effects connected
with random matching of players, mistakes in decisions,
and biological mutations can play a significant role in
such systems. Therefore to describe real systems one
should deal with stochastic dynamics of finitely many in-
teracting individuals. Hence the concept of evolutionarily
stable strategy was reformulated by Nowak et al. [8] so
that it takes into account the stochastic fluctuations in
finite populations as well.
In this paper we discuss a simple stochastic evolution-
ary dynamics that may be described as a (biased) 1D
random walk with two absorbing states. We show a way
to visualize the dynamics, compute fixation probabilities,
and easily decide whether a strategy is evolutionarily sta-
ble or not.
Pairwise comparison stochastic dynamics. Let
us consider a population of N players who have two
strategies at their disposal: A and B. The individuals
take part in a two-player symmetric game given by the
following payoff matrix:
A B
A a b
B c d
(1)
where the ijth entry, i, j = A,B, is the payoff of a player
using the strategy i against a player with the strategy
j. Throughout the paper we assume that a > c and
d > b, so that A and B are both pure Nash strategies
(i.e. (A,A) and (B,B) are symmetric Nash equilibria)
and x∗ = (d − b)/(d − c + a − b) is an unstable mixed
Nash equilibrium. An example of this setup is the Stag-
hunt game [2, 3].
Let us denote by x the fraction of individuals playing
A. As it is usually done in the context of population
dynamics based on game contests, we assume that players
receive payoffs equal to their expected rewards from a
game against a random opponent. Hence the payoffs of
A and B are given by
fA(x) = ax+ b(1− x) (2a)
fB(x) = cx+ d(1− x) (2b)
The standard pairwise comparison stochastic dynam-
ics is as follows [9]. At any discrete moment of time,
two players are chosen at random, a focal one (say an
2X-strategist, X ∈ {A,B}) and a model one (say a Y -
strategist). The focal player adopts the strategy of the
model one with probability depending on the payoff dif-
ferences, namely
p(X → Y ) =
1
2
+
1
2
· gw(fY − fX) (3)
where gw is an arbitrary antisymmetric, non-decreasing
function and w is a parameter called selection pressure
such that if w → 0, then gw → 0. Particular choices of
gw(∆f) define various dynamics. Common possibilities
include gw = w sgn∆f (binary model; “stronger-wins”),
gw = w(∆f)/(∆fmax) (‘linear advantage’) and gw = (1−
e−w∆f)/(1 + e−w∆f) (Fermi rule).
The replicator equation
dx/dt = x(1 − x) · gw(fA(x)− fB(x)) describes time
evolution of x in the infinite population – the frequency
of the more profitable strategy increases at rate propor-
tional to gw and to the frequency of encounters between
A and B [7]. Under our assumptions, x = 0 and x = 1
are two asymptotically stable stationary points and x∗
is an unstable one.
The discrete model can be described by a one-
dimensional random walk – a Markov chain with (N +1)
states: {0, 1N , . . . , 1}, of which two, 0 and 1, are absorb-
ing, and with transition probabilities
p(x→ x+
1
N
) = x(1− x)p(B → A) =: a+(x) (4a)
p(x→ x−
1
N
) = x(1− x)p(A→ B) =: a−(x) (4b)
Evolutionary stability. According to the classical
definition for infinite populations, strategy B is consid-
ered evolutionarily stable (ESS) if in a state with a
sufficiently small fraction of A-players, the expected pay-
off of B is greater than that of A. Hence a uniform popu-
lation of B-players is protected by selection against inva-
sion of a small number of mutants playingA [1]. In games
with two pure Nash equilibria, both A and B strategies
are evolutionarily stable.
In finite populations, the classical concept was ex-
tended to take into account the possibility of a single
mutant taking over the whole population due to stochas-
tic fluctuations. The following definition was proposed
in [8].
Strategy B is evolutionarily stable in finite pop-
ulations oz size N []ESS(N)] if in the situation when
(N−1) individuals play B, and a single one plays A, two
inequalities hold: (i) the A-player has a smaller expected
payoff than a B-player (resilience to invasion) and (ii)
the probability of fixation of strategy A and extinction
of B is smaller than 1/N (resilience to replacement).
The first inequality is a discrete analogue of the ESS
condition for infinite populations. The second one tells
us whether the chance for the population to acquire the
invador’s strategy (and the dominating strategy to go
extinct) is smaller than in the neutral-selection model
(i.e. the unbiased random walk).
To check if B is an ESS(N) one needs to compute
the fixation probability of A, supposing we start from
a population consisting of one A-player and (N − 1) B-
players. In other words, we ask what is the probability
of a biased random walk starting at position 1N to reach
1 without visiting 0.
Our novel approach is as follows. We start with a one-
dimensional stochastic process on the continuous space
[0, 1]. We use a continuous-space potential function to
get formulas for fixation probabilities. Then we construct
a discrete-space process corresponding to the continuous
one and show how reversal of the procedure lets us com-
pute fixation probabilities in the discrete case and decide
quickly whether a strategy is evolutionary stable in finite
populations.
Potential in continuous and discrete processes.
Let us consider a process Xt with continuous time t solv-
ing the Itoˆ stochastic differential equation
dXt = −
1
2
ϕ′(Xt)dt+ dWt (5)
where ϕ′ = dϕ/dx is a derivative of an arbitrary (smooth
enough) function ϕ, defined on the interval [0, 1]. We
will call ϕ the potential function. The above process can
be seen as a movement of a point down the slope of ϕ,
disturbed by the Brownian diffusion of unit variance. It
was introduced in game theory models in [10]. Let us set
absorbing boundary conditions at x = 0 and x = 1, and
denote by ρ(x0) the probability of fixation at point x = 1
provided that we start from x = x0. This probability
satisfies the stationary Kolmogorov backward equation
[11, 12],
1
2
ϕ′ρ′ −
1
2
ρ′′ = 0 (6)
which combined with boundary conditions ρ(0) = 0 and
ρ(1) = 1 gives
ρ(x0) =
∫ x0
0
eϕ(x)dx∫ 1
0 e
ϕ(x)dx
(7)
Let us note that simmilar diffusion approximations
were used to calculate fixation probabilities in [13–15].
However, it is possible to contruct a discrete process cor-
responding exactly to continuous one defined above. Con-
sider two objects, a ball and a pawn, located initially at
the same point x0 ∈ {0,
1
N , . . . , 1}. Let the ball move ac-
cording to the continuous process (5). Whenever the ball
reaches any of the lattice points {0, 1N , . . . , 1}, we move
the pawn to the ball. It follows from Eq. (7) that the
motion of the pawn is a discrete process with transition
probabilities given by
3a+(x0) =
∫ x0
x0−1/N
eϕ(x)dx∫ x0+1/N
x0−1/N
eϕ(x)dx
(8a)
a−(x0) =
∫ x0+1/N
x0
eϕ(x)dx∫ x0+1/N
x0−1/N
eϕ(x)dx
(8b)
Note that the pawn and the ball will reach an absorb-
ing state (0 or 1) exactly at the same time. Therefore
the probability of the pawn’s fixation at 1, provided it
started at x0, may be computed in the same way as for
the ball – with Eq. (7). Various choices for ϕ give us
different discrete dynamics – setting ϕ appropriately we
can recover any desired discrete random walk. As long as
the random walk is one-dimensional (i.e. there are only
two possible strategies), the potential function always ex-
ists, though it is not unique. To get one, it is possible
to assume that ϕ is linear on every interval [ kN ,
k+1
N ], set
values at x = 0 and x = 1N arbitrarily and recurrently
find the values at points 2N , . . . , 1 by solving Eqs. (8).
This was done to obtain the exact potentials shown in
Fig. 1.
There is a straightforward connection between the po-
tential function and the evolutionary stability. Indeed,
one can easily observe that a strategy is an ESS (in in-
finite populations) iff the potential has a local minimum
at the boundary point corresponding to that strategy. In
other words, strategy B is evolutionarily stable iff ϕ is
increasing at x = 0, whereas A is stable whenever the po-
tential decreases at x = 1. This argument holds also for
condition (i) of ESS(N) in discrete-space systems, apart
from that one should look at finite differences rather than
derivatives when determining monotonicity at x = 0 and
x = 1. Note that in games with two pure Nash equilibria,
condition (i) is always satisfied both for A and B.
As for condition (ii), we now present two general laws
which are helpful with calculating fixation probabilities.
The first one is just the reformulation of condition (ii) in
terms of the potential function.
Mean-exponential-potential law. The following
inequality is equivalent to condition (ii):
1
1/N
∫ 1/N
0
eϕ(x)dx <
∫ 1
0
eϕ(x)dx (9)
This is an immediate consequence of Eq. (7). It can be
called the mean-exponential-potential law: strategy B
satisfies condition (ii) of ESS(N) iff the average of eϕ(x)
is smaller on [0, 1N ] than on the whole space [0, 1]. In the
limit N →∞ we get
eϕ(0) <
∫ 1
0
eϕ(x)dx (10)
Mean-potential law. In the weak-selection case,
that is when w ≪ 1N , we can assume that ϕ(x) =
ϕ(0) plus some small x-dependent perturbation. Conse-
quently Eq. (9) can be approximated by a linear term in
the expansion of eϕ(x), giving that in the weak-selection
case, B is an ESS(N) iff
1
1/N
∫ 1/N
0
ϕ(x)dx <
∫ 1
0
ϕ(x)dx (11)
Again, in the limit N →∞ we get
ϕ(0) <
∫ 1
0
ϕ(x)dx (12)
This is an easy-in-use criterion, and we show in the fol-
lowing paragraphs how to apply it to two classical pair-
wise comparison models in order to get conditions for
evolutionary stability of given strategies.
Model 1: Stronger wins. In such a dynamics, the
probability of adopting the opponent’s payoff depends
only on the sign of the payoff difference – the transition
probabilities are
a±(x) =
1
2
±
w
2
· sgn(x− x∗) (13)
Here and further on we exclude steps in which the state
of the population does not change; that happens in par-
ticular when the focal and model players play the same
strategy. Hence the term x(1− x) in Eq. (4) is dropped.
As the drift is a step function, the potential ϕ is ex-
pected to be proportional to −|x− x∗|. Indeed, one may
check the following potential satisfies Eqs. (8):
ϕ(x) = − (N lnκ) |x− x∗| (14)
with κ = 1+w1−w . Therefore one may use Eq. (7) to calculate
the probability that one A-player overtakes the whole
population. We get
ρ(1/N) =
κ−(x
∗
−1/N)N − κ−x
∗N
2−
(
κ−x∗N + κ−(1−x∗)N
) (15)
Now, condition (ii) of ESS(N), or equivalently the
mean-exponential-potential law (9), gives us
x∗ > 1 +
ln
(
1−
√
1− κ−N (N(κ− 1) + 1)
)
N lnκ
=: xcr
(16)
This is an exact condition on the mixed Nash equilib-
rium x∗ for strategy B to be evolutionarily stable. By
symmetry, A is evolutionarily stable if x∗ < 1 − xcr. Of
course for xcr < x
∗ < 1− xcr, both strategies are evolu-
tionarily stable.
4In the weak-selection case (w ≪ 1/N), we compute the
limit of the right-hand side of (16) as wN → 0 and we
get
x∗ > 1−
√
1
2
−
1
2N
(17)
Finally we take N →∞ and obtain
x∗ > 1−
√
1
2
(18)
By analogy with 1/3 law [8], this could be called the
law of
(
1−
√
1
2
)
. Inequality (18) can be also easily ob-
tained from the mean-potential law as the mean potential
on [0, 1] is equal to − c2 ((x
∗)2 + (1− x∗)2) for c = N ln κ
and ϕ(0) = −cx∗.
Model 2: Linear advantage. In this model [9],
the probability of adopting the model player’s strategy
depends linearly on the difference of payoffs:
a±(x) =
1
2
±
w
2
·
fA − fB
∆fmax
(19)
where ∆fmax = max {|a− c| , |d− b|} is the maximal pos-
sible payoff difference. Setting for simplicity of notation
k = 2 · a−b−c+d∆fmax we can write
a±(x) =
1
2
±
wk
4
(x− x∗) (20)
One can notice that the expected value of one-step dis-
placement is 1N (a+− a−) =
wk
2N (x− x
∗), and its variance
is 4a+a−N2 =
1
N2 + O(
w2k2
N2 ). From Eq. (5) one gets that
in the continuous case ϕ′ = −2 µσ2 . Hence the natural
candidate for the potential function is
ϕ˜ = −2N
∫
wk
2
(x− x∗) = −
wkN
2
(x − x∗)2 (21)
Unfortunately such a function does not satisfy Eqs. (8).
If it did, the conditions for evolutionary stability would
follow immediately: the mean value of that poten-
tial on [0, 1] would be − c6
(
(1 − x∗)3 − (−x∗)3
)
=
− c2
(
(x∗)2 − x∗ + 13
)
for c = wkN , and as ϕ˜(0) =
− c6 (x
∗)3 one would get from Eq. (12) that ρ(1/N) < 1/N
iff x∗ > 13 . Note that this is the Nowak’s 1/3-law [8].
By this calculation we proved that the law holds for a
discrete stochastic process for which ϕ˜ is the real poten-
tial. However, one can show that fixation probabilities
in such an auxiliary model and the true one are close to
each other, at least for large N and weak selection w. In-
tuitively, this is because the difference in transition prob-
abilities between the true and the auxiliary model are of
order 1N3 |ϕ˜
′′| ∼ wkN2 , and fixation is reached on average in
all play B all play A
-0.8
0
approximate potential (analytical)
exact potential (piecewise linear)
mean potential (exact)
log of mean exponential potential (exact)
all play B all play A
-0.1
0.2
FIG. 1. Potential function, guessed from Eq. (22) (ap-
proximate) and computed numerically (exact), for two models
with linear advantage update: (top) a stug-hunt game with
x∗ = 0.25, (bottom) a three-player game with the following
payoffs: A receives 4 when playing against AA or BB and 0
otherwise, B gets 17 against AB or BA, otherwise nothing.
Number of players and selection pressure are N = 10 and
w = 0.1. In the first model, both strategies are pure Nash
equilibria. A is evolutionarily stable in finite populations be-
cause at the point when all play A the potential (i) has a local
minimum and (ii) is below the mean potential. In the second
model, both pure strategies are unstable – A does not satisfy
condition (ii), whereas B fails to meet condition (i).
O(N + N
2
(wkN)2+1 ) steps, which means that the expected
number of steps in which the models disagree decreases
to zero as wk · ( 1N +
1
(wkN)2+1 ). However, a precise proof
of this fact is beyond the scope of this Letter.
Discussion. We introduced a concept of potential
function for discrete random walks. The function is de-
fined on the whole interval [0, 1], which is in contrast
to previous approaches [16], where the potential was de-
fined on a discrete set of points. This allowed us to get
an immediate correspondence with continuous-space sys-
tems and stochastic differential equations. As mentioned
before, the potential exists for any game with two strate-
gies.
From the numerical point of view, this procedure is
by no means easier than direct computation of fixation
probabilities (see, e.g., [8] for the exact formula). How-
ever, one may usually guess or compute an approximate
potential by comparing the expected displacement in one
step and its variance with Eq. (5):
ϕ′ ≈ −2
µ
σ2
= −2N
a+ − a−
4a+a−
≈ −2Ngw (22)
This approximation is likely to give good estimates for
fixation probabilities and lets us easily assess evolution-
arily stability of a given strategy with the mean-potential
5law. If necessary, a quality check of the approximation
is possible, both numerical (as shown in Fig. 1) and an-
alytical (as sketched in Model 2).
Other directions. The potential function approach
is more general than presented here. Mean-potential laws
can be applied tomulti-player games [17, 18]. In Fig. 1
we present an example of a three-player game with a
unique pure ESS which is not an ESS(N). This is caused
by the presence of an asymptotically stable interior point
(an evolutionarily stable mixed Nash equilibrium). In
two-player games with evolutionarily stable strategies, at
least one of them is evolutionarily stable in finite popu-
lations.
As an alternative to the ESS(N), one may consider
the concept of stochastic stability [19] introduced in
evolutionary games in [10] and analyzed, e.g., in [20–24].
Models investigated in those papers allow spontaneous
mutations, occurring with the rate ǫ = 1 − w. That
means that even in homogeneous populations, individu-
als can change their strategy. The two absorbing states
disappear and we obtain an ergodic Markov chain with
a unique stationary distribution. A population state x0
is called stochastically stable if in the limit ǫ → 0 the
stationary distribution is concentrated in x0. The main
result of [20] is that in the “stronger-wins” model, the
strategy B (i.e. the state x = 0) is stochastically stable
iff it has a bigger basin of attraction, that is if x∗ > 1/2.
This can be compared with the limit w → 1 of (16).
In this strong-selection case xcr = 1, and we get that
both pure strategies are evolutionarily stable. However,
the potential function allows us to formulate a more gen-
eral statement: if there exists a potential function ϕǫ
such that ϕǫ(x) → +∞ with ǫ → 0 for all x 6= x0 and
ϕǫ(x0)→ 0, then under some convergence conditions the
state x0 is stochastically stable.
Summary. We presented a novel way to analyze
finite-state one-dimensional random walks. It is based
on an exact transformation of continuous stochastic pro-
cesses into discrete ones which preserves fixation prob-
abilities. It allows us to transfer the intuitive concept
of potential function from the continuous onto the dis-
crete case. Using the potential function, we formulated
two simple criteria to determine whether the probabil-
ity of fixation in a given boundary point is higher com-
pared to an unbiased random walk. We called them the
mean-exponential-potential law (Eq. (10)) and the mean
potential law (Eq. (12)). Both of them have immediate
implications for evolutionary game theory, allowing quick
identification of evolutionarily stable strategies in finite
populations. We illustrated their usage on two exam-
ples of 2-player evolutionary games – in particular, we
re-derived the 1/3 law, which occurred to be a special
case of the mean-potential law – and suggested a few
other applications. The presented ideas are more general
though, and we hope they will be useful in various fields
of study.
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